Recent Press/Summer 2008
John S. Park is director of the Korea Working Group at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. and participated in the Midwest and National Assemblies.
An edited version of his article on the destruction of North Korea's nuclear cooling tower will appear in the August issue of Jane's Intelligence Review.
NORTH KOREA BLOWS UP REACTOR COOLING TOWER: ADVENT OF CREATIVE DESTRUCTION?
After a six-month delay, North Korea submitted its nuclear declaration to Six-Party Talks host China on June 26. The day after, North Korea arranged for the televised demolition of the cooling tower at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Have we just witnessed the advent of creative destruction by North Korea?
Coined by the economist Joseph Schumpeter, creative destruction explains how innovation and transformation enable companies to survive. Almost all successful businesses that eventually fail, irrespective of how dominant they were, suffer that fate because of their failure to innovate. In the North Korean context, the ongoing debate on whether Pyongyang will make the strategic decision to give up its nuclear arsenal bears a striking resemblance to creative destruction. Should North Korea destroy its nuclear weapons program and arsenal, it would fundamentally change the manner in which it engages the international community. Such an innovation would present new opportunities to realize sustainable economic development and the end of enmity with old adversaries. While positive developments, it is too early to tell whether recent North Korean actions are evidence of creative destruction or a continuation of a policy of extracting concessions without ultimately giving up its nuclear warheads.
Two Bridges
What can be said is that North Korea has been incrementally destroying one bridge while collaborating on the construction of another. The first bridge leads to proliferation. The demolition of the cooling tower is the most dramatic symbol of North Korean denuclearization activities to date. It is far more attention grabbing than the early progress made in the fall of 2007 with the discharging of fuel rods from the reactor – components that have a greater significance in terms of nuclear proliferation than the cooling tower.
Importantly, Washington and Pyongyang have created an opportunity to engage in phase III Six-Party Talks negotiations on a strong footing. In effect, as Pyongyang has been destroying the bridge to proliferation, it has been increasingly working with Washington and the other Six-Party Talks members on building the second bridge, which leads to denuclearization. With the rapid action-for-action exchange – which occurred during a two-day period that saw Pyongyang submit its nuclear declaration, President Bush notify Congress that North Korea would be removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List and Trading with the Enemy Act restrictions, and North Korea demolish the Yongbyon cooling tower – there is now new momentum in the Six-Party Talks process.
Bumps Ahead on the Bridge to Denuclearization
Despite the dramatic events in late June, many analysts remain highly doubtful that Pyongyang will eventually hand over its nuclear warheads. Having already reprocessed enough plutonium sufficient for a rudimentary nuclear arsenal, disabling the Yongbyon complex is deemed to be more symbolically significant. Nuclear disablement is substantively important if the primary tactical purpose is viewed to be increasing the time and resources required for restarting plutonium production.
Sharing analysts' doubts, many in the U.S. Congress are less focused on the spectacle of the cooling tower implosion and more concerned about the inadequacy of what is claimed to be in the nuclear declaration. North Korea's lack of disclosure on its reported uranium enrichment program and its nuclear cooperation with Syria have reinforced concerns that the Bush administration has recklessly lowered the bar on Pyongyang's nuclear declaration. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, the chief U.S. negotiator at the Six-Party Talks, has countered by asserting that Washington is directly dealing with the immediate threat of North Korea weaponizing its plutonium stockpile. While acknowledging the importance of the other issues, Hill has stated that a primary U.S. concern is addressing the clear and present danger of the plutonium-based weapons program and arsenal. With the anticipated completion of nuclear disablement at the Yongbyon complex, the Bush administration will soon embark on negotiating the specific terms of nuclear weapons rollback in North Korea.
Now that Pyongyang has submitted its declaration, an immediate challenge will be implementing an effective verification regime. Mirroring the period in the early 1990s when Pyongyang submitted an earlier nuclear declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to enter into a safeguards agreement, the recent declaration submission marks a critical point in current denuclearization efforts. When the IAEA sought to verify the earlier declaration by conducting technical analyses of samples taken from Yongbyon facilities, serious discrepancies emerged. Tensions escalated over several months, almost to the point of war. An eleventh hour meeting between former president Jimmy Carter and North Korean leader Kim Il Sung averted the outbreak of hostilities and initiated a bilateral process that culminated in the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework.
Largely due to the Six-Party Talks' crisis management-enhancing impact on the region, such a rapid escalation in tensions is less likely. However, if inspectors are not able to verify the data in the recent declaration – particularly the quantity of weapons-grade plutonium that North Korea produced over key reprocessing campaigns – the Bush administration's ability to continue engaging North Korea on denuclearization will be compromised. The ensuing application of stringent sanctions would result in Pyongyang's rapid repairing of its bridge to proliferation. The talks would then be deadlocked leaving China scrambling to salvage the denuclearization process.
A Case for Creative Destruction
It remains uncertain whether Pyongyang is ready for creative destruction and has made the strategic decision to give up its nuclear weapons. What is clear is that the implosion of a cooling tower may make a new Libyan model possible for North Korea This is not the Libyan model that was at the center of the first Bush administration's North Korea policy – i.e., complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament prior to concessions – but rather the recent Goldman Sachs-linked model as detailed in a June 19 Bloomberg report that went unnoticed. The Libyan government had hired Goldman Sachs to help the North African nation's central bank prepare and provide information on Libya's behalf to credit rating agencies. Having improved relations with the West after giving up its nascent uranium enrichment-based weapons program in 2004, the Libyan government is now seeking to bring in Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell and others to expand production of its previously sanctions-impeded oil industry.
Tripoli's decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons program and boost oil sales to the international market represents a new Libyan model – one that is focused on the benefits resulting from creative destruction rather than on the precise manner in which nuclear disarmament occurs. North Korea could benefit from this new model. Sitting on largely untapped mineral resources during a period of record-breaking commodity prices, Chairman Kim Jong Il's decision to effect creative destruction would bolster his ability to repair his economy and peacefully co-exist with his neighbors and the United States – all the while preserving his regime just as a certain Libyan colonel had done.
What's Next?
Two key factors could quickly undermine the recently created momentum in the Six-Party Talks process. The first is an inadequate verification mechanism emerging from the verification principles agreed to in Beijing in mid-July. A mechanism that lacks the robust methods required to confirm that the declaration is "complete and correct" could come to fruition. Having effectively lowered the bar on what is presently contained in the declaration, the Bush administration has little flexibility on the verification issue. Based on the experience of U.S. officials during the 1994 North Korean nuclear imbroglio, the North Koreans are likely to draw out the negotiations on how short notice access to declared and suspect sites, environmental sampling of materials and equipment, and interviews with North Korean personnel will be specifically conducted. With only about six months left in the Bush administration, an unprecedented pace of agreement on these topics would have to be achieved.
The second factor is North Korea's revival of its demand for light-water reactors (LWRs). Under the 2005 Joint Statement, the six parties agreed to discuss the provision of LWRs to North Korea "at an appropriate time." Though dormant for almost three years, the LWR issue has not been tamed. In the aftermath of the cooling tower demolition, North Korea may feel emboldened to soon declare the arrival of "an appropriate time" to table the LWR issue. Watching the Bush administration attempt to make as much progress on phase III nuclear rollback as possible, Pyongyang may introduce its own interpretation of the principle of "action for action" in the form of a ratio. Rather than one action being reciprocated with another action, Pyongyang may insist that for every one North Korean action, two or three U.S. actions be performed. In doing so, Pyongyang may introduce its own version of inflation where more will be required for less from the Kim Jong Il regime.
John S. Park is director of the Korea Working Group at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect those of USIP.
An edited version of his article on the destruction of North Korea's nuclear cooling tower will appear in the August issue of Jane's Intelligence Review.
NORTH KOREA BLOWS UP REACTOR COOLING TOWER: ADVENT OF CREATIVE DESTRUCTION?
After a six-month delay, North Korea submitted its nuclear declaration to Six-Party Talks host China on June 26. The day after, North Korea arranged for the televised demolition of the cooling tower at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Have we just witnessed the advent of creative destruction by North Korea?
Coined by the economist Joseph Schumpeter, creative destruction explains how innovation and transformation enable companies to survive. Almost all successful businesses that eventually fail, irrespective of how dominant they were, suffer that fate because of their failure to innovate. In the North Korean context, the ongoing debate on whether Pyongyang will make the strategic decision to give up its nuclear arsenal bears a striking resemblance to creative destruction. Should North Korea destroy its nuclear weapons program and arsenal, it would fundamentally change the manner in which it engages the international community. Such an innovation would present new opportunities to realize sustainable economic development and the end of enmity with old adversaries. While positive developments, it is too early to tell whether recent North Korean actions are evidence of creative destruction or a continuation of a policy of extracting concessions without ultimately giving up its nuclear warheads.
Two Bridges
What can be said is that North Korea has been incrementally destroying one bridge while collaborating on the construction of another. The first bridge leads to proliferation. The demolition of the cooling tower is the most dramatic symbol of North Korean denuclearization activities to date. It is far more attention grabbing than the early progress made in the fall of 2007 with the discharging of fuel rods from the reactor – components that have a greater significance in terms of nuclear proliferation than the cooling tower.
Importantly, Washington and Pyongyang have created an opportunity to engage in phase III Six-Party Talks negotiations on a strong footing. In effect, as Pyongyang has been destroying the bridge to proliferation, it has been increasingly working with Washington and the other Six-Party Talks members on building the second bridge, which leads to denuclearization. With the rapid action-for-action exchange – which occurred during a two-day period that saw Pyongyang submit its nuclear declaration, President Bush notify Congress that North Korea would be removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List and Trading with the Enemy Act restrictions, and North Korea demolish the Yongbyon cooling tower – there is now new momentum in the Six-Party Talks process.
Bumps Ahead on the Bridge to Denuclearization
Despite the dramatic events in late June, many analysts remain highly doubtful that Pyongyang will eventually hand over its nuclear warheads. Having already reprocessed enough plutonium sufficient for a rudimentary nuclear arsenal, disabling the Yongbyon complex is deemed to be more symbolically significant. Nuclear disablement is substantively important if the primary tactical purpose is viewed to be increasing the time and resources required for restarting plutonium production.
Sharing analysts' doubts, many in the U.S. Congress are less focused on the spectacle of the cooling tower implosion and more concerned about the inadequacy of what is claimed to be in the nuclear declaration. North Korea's lack of disclosure on its reported uranium enrichment program and its nuclear cooperation with Syria have reinforced concerns that the Bush administration has recklessly lowered the bar on Pyongyang's nuclear declaration. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, the chief U.S. negotiator at the Six-Party Talks, has countered by asserting that Washington is directly dealing with the immediate threat of North Korea weaponizing its plutonium stockpile. While acknowledging the importance of the other issues, Hill has stated that a primary U.S. concern is addressing the clear and present danger of the plutonium-based weapons program and arsenal. With the anticipated completion of nuclear disablement at the Yongbyon complex, the Bush administration will soon embark on negotiating the specific terms of nuclear weapons rollback in North Korea.
Now that Pyongyang has submitted its declaration, an immediate challenge will be implementing an effective verification regime. Mirroring the period in the early 1990s when Pyongyang submitted an earlier nuclear declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to enter into a safeguards agreement, the recent declaration submission marks a critical point in current denuclearization efforts. When the IAEA sought to verify the earlier declaration by conducting technical analyses of samples taken from Yongbyon facilities, serious discrepancies emerged. Tensions escalated over several months, almost to the point of war. An eleventh hour meeting between former president Jimmy Carter and North Korean leader Kim Il Sung averted the outbreak of hostilities and initiated a bilateral process that culminated in the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework.
Largely due to the Six-Party Talks' crisis management-enhancing impact on the region, such a rapid escalation in tensions is less likely. However, if inspectors are not able to verify the data in the recent declaration – particularly the quantity of weapons-grade plutonium that North Korea produced over key reprocessing campaigns – the Bush administration's ability to continue engaging North Korea on denuclearization will be compromised. The ensuing application of stringent sanctions would result in Pyongyang's rapid repairing of its bridge to proliferation. The talks would then be deadlocked leaving China scrambling to salvage the denuclearization process.
A Case for Creative Destruction
It remains uncertain whether Pyongyang is ready for creative destruction and has made the strategic decision to give up its nuclear weapons. What is clear is that the implosion of a cooling tower may make a new Libyan model possible for North Korea This is not the Libyan model that was at the center of the first Bush administration's North Korea policy – i.e., complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament prior to concessions – but rather the recent Goldman Sachs-linked model as detailed in a June 19 Bloomberg report that went unnoticed. The Libyan government had hired Goldman Sachs to help the North African nation's central bank prepare and provide information on Libya's behalf to credit rating agencies. Having improved relations with the West after giving up its nascent uranium enrichment-based weapons program in 2004, the Libyan government is now seeking to bring in Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell and others to expand production of its previously sanctions-impeded oil industry.
Tripoli's decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons program and boost oil sales to the international market represents a new Libyan model – one that is focused on the benefits resulting from creative destruction rather than on the precise manner in which nuclear disarmament occurs. North Korea could benefit from this new model. Sitting on largely untapped mineral resources during a period of record-breaking commodity prices, Chairman Kim Jong Il's decision to effect creative destruction would bolster his ability to repair his economy and peacefully co-exist with his neighbors and the United States – all the while preserving his regime just as a certain Libyan colonel had done.
What's Next?
Two key factors could quickly undermine the recently created momentum in the Six-Party Talks process. The first is an inadequate verification mechanism emerging from the verification principles agreed to in Beijing in mid-July. A mechanism that lacks the robust methods required to confirm that the declaration is "complete and correct" could come to fruition. Having effectively lowered the bar on what is presently contained in the declaration, the Bush administration has little flexibility on the verification issue. Based on the experience of U.S. officials during the 1994 North Korean nuclear imbroglio, the North Koreans are likely to draw out the negotiations on how short notice access to declared and suspect sites, environmental sampling of materials and equipment, and interviews with North Korean personnel will be specifically conducted. With only about six months left in the Bush administration, an unprecedented pace of agreement on these topics would have to be achieved.
The second factor is North Korea's revival of its demand for light-water reactors (LWRs). Under the 2005 Joint Statement, the six parties agreed to discuss the provision of LWRs to North Korea "at an appropriate time." Though dormant for almost three years, the LWR issue has not been tamed. In the aftermath of the cooling tower demolition, North Korea may feel emboldened to soon declare the arrival of "an appropriate time" to table the LWR issue. Watching the Bush administration attempt to make as much progress on phase III nuclear rollback as possible, Pyongyang may introduce its own interpretation of the principle of "action for action" in the form of a ratio. Rather than one action being reciprocated with another action, Pyongyang may insist that for every one North Korean action, two or three U.S. actions be performed. In doing so, Pyongyang may introduce its own version of inflation where more will be required for less from the Kim Jong Il regime.
John S. Park is director of the Korea Working Group at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect those of USIP.